![]() ![]() In April of 2012, Jessica Jauch was indicted by a grand jury on drug-related charges and a capias warrant was issued. Armstrong before a judge were less than those in Coleman, and the conduct in Coleman shocked the conscience, thus the court determined the defendants’ deliberate indifference must certainly “shock the conscience.” Having found Armstrong’s case to survive this three-part analysis, the court reversed the District Court’s summary judgment and remanded the case. Armstrong’s claims survived summary judgement because of the custom of refusing to accept the “Inmate Request Forms.” Finally, the court addressed whether or not this instance of “deliberate indifference,” viewed in the totality of the circumstances, shocks the conscience. In applying this standard, the court found all of Mr. The court found the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a country-wide concern amongst jail administration regarding the possibility of prolonged detention. ![]() ![]() Heretofore opinion appears to be a procedural analysis this will be discussed later.įor its substantive due process analysis, the court applied a “deliberate indifference” standard that had been recently utilized by the Supreme Court in County of Sacramento v. Lastly, before starting its substantive due process analysis, the court highlighted a procedural deficiency in Mr. Most of these specific references state an argument akin to: abridgment of an individual’s interest, without proper procedures, is unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit also referenced numerous prior court opinions, mainly from the Seventh Circuit, that claim to analyze similar issues under substantive due process. The court in Armstrong then referred to a “first appearance” as an “established” procedure. The Coleman quote finds a “first appearance” to be vital to procedural due process. A second quote used by the court is from Coleman v. However, the Armstrong court utilized the quote only to establish that the Constitution guards against extended detention. A quote utilized by the court explicitly states finding a DPC violation for prolonged detention would be dependent on the procedures the State afforded the detainee. The court first addressed some procedural concerns. Finally, the court outlined its three-step analysis under substantive due process: examine whether the DPC protects against extended detention determine whether the defendants’ conduct offended the standards of substantive due process and consider whether the totality of the circumstances shocks the conscience. Armstrong’s § 1983 claim depended entirely on the Fourteenth Amendment. The court believed it necessary to address why Due Process claims in the context of pre-hearing detention should “play out on the yielding natural grass of substantive due process.” The court began by acknowledging the Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand substantive due process when a “particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection.” Next, the court explained that Armstrong’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims were insufficient under Seventh Circuit precedent, concluding Mr. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a substantive due process violation. ![]() The district court granted summary judgement in favor of the defendants with respect to all of Mr. Armstrong asserted a § 1983 claim based on Constitutional violations under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Armstrong’s release, he filed a civil suit against the Sheriff and various other government officials who were directly involved in the detention and jailing of Mr. Armstrong wrote out an “Inmate Request Form” and on each occasion the guards refused to accept the forms. Armstrong repeatedly queried about his court date but was repeatedly assured he was on the “will call” list. However, a mistake was made in the transposition of Mr. Armstrong on a “will call” list of detainees waiting for court. Armstrong’s detainment the officers placed Mr. Armstrong surrendered himself after he learned that a “body attachment warrant” had been issued for his arrest regarding for child support arrearages. The circuits proffering an argument for utilizing a procedural due process analysis, over a substantive due process analysis, make a more compelling argument because their premises are simple and direct. However, there is a circuit split over whether to analyze due process claims arising from prolonged detentions under substantive or procedural due process. It is well established in federal courts that pre-hearing detentions, before arraignment or a comparable formal hearing, are limited in duration by the Due Process Clause (DPC) of the Fourteenth Amendment. Zach Kurzhals, Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review ![]()
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